

Russia-U.S. Relations under Biden Administration

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I. Introduction

- The purpose of this study is
 - To analyze the meaning of strengthening of Chinese challenge for global power to U.S. and Russia
 - and to explore implications for the Korea-Russia Relations

Power Transition Theory

- “Power Transition deals with the pattern of changing power relationships in world politics. It provides a probabilistic tool by which to measure structural changes that forecast how probable changes in cooperative or confrontational tactics will affect the likelihood of preserving peace or waging war.”
- “Power Transition theory is a dynamic and structural model for analyzing fundamental shifts in global power.”
- <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-296>


- Dissatisfaction of growing power challenges *status quo* of global order.
- Challenges by dissatisfied growing powers, and balancing efforts of existing hegemonic powers constitute a source of strategic instability in the global order.

Power transition between US-China GDP (trillions US\$, Constant Price)

Source: "Chinese economy to overtake US 'by 2028' due to Covid," BBC News, 26 December 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55454146>

US and Chinese economies 2010-2035

Gross domestic product in \$US trillions (constant prices)



Source: CEBR World Economic League Table 2021

- Chinese challenge for global power indicates,
 - for the US, power transition as a source of global instability
 - for Russia, emerging 'multicentered global order'
- The U.S. view of global order/competition on values and development model
 - mirroring of Russia's perception of world competition (§13 of 2015 Russia' National Security Strategy)

→ Differences and similarities found in the perception of global order between Russia and the U.S.

II. China, a G2 in Dissatisfaction

- ‘China Dream’ declared by General Secretary Xi Jinping in November 2012
- Building an ‘Advanced Socialist State’ by 2050 maintained at the 19th Party Congress via;
 - ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative
 - Chinese connective expansion vision, declared by Mr. Xi at the Summit meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, in November 2014
 - ‘China’s Technical Rise’ & ‘Made in China 2025’ initiatives
 - China’s high tech development strategy to innovate its manufacturing industry
 - With 3-stage of development strategy to achieve a top position in the global manufacturing industry networks during the last stage of initiative (2024-2045)
 - ‘China’s Military Rise’ program
 - “The Chinese Dream is to make the country strong. Without a strong military, a country can be neither safe nor strong.”
 - ‘Active Defense’
 - 2015 Chinese Military Strategy included the newest element, placing an emphasis on **cyber and outer** spaces.

China's claim of 'nine-dash-line'

- China's geopolitical confrontation with U.S. and other states
- Red line: China's claims
- Other lines: 200 nautical mile of EEZs
- 'Nine-dash-line' in the EEZs of other states is unlawful (§56 of the UN Conventions and Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)).

- Source of the map: "Nine-dash line drawing trouble in Vietnam," *The ASEAN Post*, 28 October 2019, <https://theaseanpost.com/article/nine-dash-line-drawing-trouble-vietnam>



U.S. perception of China

- “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”
- *National Security Strategy of the US* (December 2017), p. 2.

US against China

- Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)
- 3 Line of Efforts in Indo-Pacific Strategy Report of June 2019
 - preparedness, partnership and promoting a networked region
- Political aspect:
 - separation of state and Chinese Communist Party (CCP); the public and members of CCP
- Economic aspect:
 - Criticism of CCP's intervening of economy, fair trade and the protection of intellectual rights
- Military aspect
 - Reset strategic arms treaties including China;
 - Sanction against 'Military End User' (MEU) included 58 Chinese and 45 Russian companies (December 2020)

- Balancing ‘China’s Military Rise’,
- ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy of Obama Administration and on
 - US growing involvement in the conflicts between China and other countries, to balance growing Chinese influence in the area
 - Freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) advocating lawful uses of the sea, in which UK, Germany, France joined
 - In March 2021, military budget asked to build a missile defense network along the Okinawa-Philippine line, investing 23.7 bil. US\$ for 6 years
- AUKUS established in September 2021

III. Russia-U.S. Relations

- on global order and security threats
- on 'domestic renewal' (Changes in Security Priorities)
- on high-tech based economy
- on the assessment of a development model
- mainly based on two documents:
 - 'Interim National Security Strategic Guidance' under Biden Administration in March 2021 (INSSG 2021)
 - National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, in July 2021 (NSS RF 2021)
 - US 'America First' of Trump Administration → the success of model of Biden Administration

III.1. Global order and security threats

■ Russia

- “Contradictions between states have intensified, associated with uneven development as a result of globalization processes, deepening the gap between the levels of well-being of countries. Values and development models have become the subject of global competition.” (NSS 2009, § 8).
- “The modern world is going through a period of transformation. The increase in the number of centers of world economic and political development.” (NSS RF 2021, §6)

■ the U.S.

- “Democratic nations are also increasingly challenged from outside by antagonistic authoritarian powers.”
- “Anti-democratic forces use misinformation, disinformation, and weaponized corruption to exploit perceived weaknesses and sow division within and among free nations, erode existing international rules, and promote alternative models of authoritarian governance.”
- “ ... the distribution of power across the world is changing, creating new threats.”
- China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran

- The desire of **Western countries to preserve their hegemony**, the crisis of modern models and instruments of economic development, an increase in imbalances in the development of states, an increase in the level of social inequality, the desire of transnational corporations to limit the role of states are accompanied by (NSS RF 2021, §8)
 - The problem of moral leadership and **the creation of an attractive ideological basis for the future world order is becoming more and more urgent**. Against the background of the crisis of the Western liberal model, (NSS RF 2021, §19)
 - Prospects for long-term development and positioning of Russia in the world are determined by its **internal potential, attractiveness of the value system, readiness and ability to realize its competitive advantages** by increasing the efficiency of public administration. (NSS RF 2021, §23)
 - “We are **in the midst of a fundamental debate about the future direction of our world**. To prevail, we must demonstrate that democracies can still deliver for our people. we have to defend our democracy, strengthen it and renew it. That means building back better our economic foundations. Reclaiming our place in international institutions. Lifting up our values at home and speaking out to defend them around the world. Modernizing our military capabilities while leading with diplomacy. Revitalizing America’s network of alliances, and the partnerships that have made the world safer for all of our peoples.” (INSSG 2021, 23)
- Renewal of democracy, economy, and value; revitalizing alliances/partnership

III.2. Domestic renewal

■ Russia

- “The main factors that determine the position and role of the Russian Federation in the world in the long term are the [high quality of human potential](#), the ability to ensure technological leadership, the effectiveness of public administration and the [transition of the economy to a new technological basis](#). The state of science, [innovation](#), industry, education, healthcare and culture is turning into [a key indicator of Russia's competitiveness](#).” (NSS RF 2021, §22)
- The people are the bearers of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation and its main asset. Russian spiritual and moral ideals and cultural and historical values, the talent of the people are the basis of statehood and are the foundation for the further development of the country. (NSS RF 2021, §28)

■ the U.S.

- “At a time of multiple, intersecting crises, we must recognize that [our strength abroad requires the United States to build back better at home](#).” (INSSG 2021, 16)
- “Building back better also requires an updated social contract that treats American workers and working families as essential at all times, not just times of crisis – with higher wages, stronger benefits, collective bargaining, and equitable and safe workplaces.” (INSSG 2021, 17)

■ Russia

- The state social and economic policy being implemented in the Russian Federation is **aimed at ensuring a decent life** and free human development, creating conditions for strengthening the **health** of citizens, increasing life expectancy, reducing mortality, improving **housing** conditions and expanding opportunities for obtaining **quality education**. (NSS RF 2021, §29)

■ The U.S.

- “More broadly, we will sustain America’s innovation edge to **improve the lives** of all Americans.” (INSSG 2021, 17)
- “**Building back better** requires us to commit ourselves to revitalizing our own **democracy**.” (INSSG 2021, 18)
- “Our work defending democracy does not end at our shores. Authoritarianism is on the global march, and we must join with **likeminded allies and partners** to revitalize democracy the world over.” (INSSG 2021, 19)
- Taken together, this agenda will strengthen our enduring advantages, and allow us to prevail in strategic competition **with China or any other nation**. (INSSG 2021, 20)

III.3. On high-Tech based economy

■ Russia

- “1) ensuring the institutional and structural restructuring of the national economy on a modern technological basis, its diversification and development based on the use of low-carbon technologies;” (NSS RF 2021, §66(1))
- “9) intensive technological renewal of the basic sectors of the economy (industry, construction, communications, energy, agriculture, mining),” (NSS RF 2021, §66(9))
- “In the context of the transition of the world economy to a new technological basis, leadership in the development of science and technology is becoming one of the key factors in increasing competitiveness and ensuring national security. The acceleration of scientific and technological progress affects all spheres of human life and affects its quality.” (NSS RF 2021, §68)

■ the U.S.

- “More broadly, we will sustain America’s innovation edge to improve the lives of all Americans. We will double down on science and technology investments, including in research and development, foundational computing technologies, and domestic leading-edge manufacturing, to enable the pursuit of numerous national strategic objectives, including in the economic, health, biotech, energy, climate, and national security domains. We will build 21st century digital infrastructure, including universal and affordable high-speed internet access and secure 5G networks. We will explore and use outer space to the benefit of humanity, and ensure the safety, stability, and security of outer space activities. We will shape emerging technology standards to boost our security, economic competitiveness, and values. And, across these initiatives, we will partner with democratic friends and allies to amplify “our collective competitive advantages. (INSSG 2021, 17-18)

III.4. The assessment of a development model

- Under Trump administration, 'America First' constituted a criteria of success of security policy or of a development model
- Under Biden administration, an emphasis is placed upon 'collective competitiveness'.

III.5. Competition for value and Russia-U.S. Relations

- Intensifying economic/military competition based on high technology
 - Though U.S. focuses on China
- Emerging global supply chain within a political/economic bloc of development model
 - For Russia, technological independence was underlined in the National Security Strategy of 2021 (NSS RF 2021, §75).
- Growing barriers against cross-bloc cooperation, particularly in high tech area.
 - U.S. sanctions against China, and Russia;
 - China also launched sanctions/retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and MICs.

- Success of a 'development model' differ from a success of a country
 - Difference between Trump and Biden Administration
- Russia may employ a soviet style of 'friendly relations' with the states that share values and development model,
 - causing economic and political burdens on Russia

IV. Implication to ROK-Russia Relations

Korea's trade with Russia(100mil US\$)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Export	101.3	46.9	47.7	69.1	73.2	77.7	69.0
Import	156.7	113.1	86.4	120.4	175.0	145.7	106.2
Trade Total	258.0	159.9	134.1	189.5	248.2	223.4	175.2
Balance	-55.4	-66.2	-38.7	-51.3	-101.8	-67.9	-37.2

- A sharp decrease with the sanctions and pandemic situation
- limits of economic cooperation
 - Global or regional conflicts among superpowers
 - Purchasing power dependent on international oil/gas price
 - Limited to a small number of trade sectors focusing on resources/materials
 - Development of import substitution industrialization in Russia
 - Sino-Russian trade

An expanding area of cooperation

- For instance, in
 - ITC (ex. ITC-based/long distance medical services)
 - Outer Space network projects (particularly for 6G network building)
- changes in security concepts demand considerations of other factors in the cooperation of high-tech area

IV.1. ITC cooperation between contact-free societies

- Information Technology(IT) connects the people in the Contact-free Period.
 - Expanded linkage changes the structure of 'nods' and 'edges'
 - Changes of Network Structure affects the behavior of actors and the performance of actors' purpose-oriented activities. (Borgatti et al. 2009)
- Openness-oriented ITC development may change the society:
 - if such changes accepted, ITC-based society directed to openness
 - if denied, ITC-based controlled society may emerge.

Typology of ITC & Society/State


		Openness Orientation	
		negative	positive
Value Orientation	Peculiar	Isolation model (B)	compromised/ pragmatic model (A)
	Universal	selective/ provisional model (C)	communal Model (D)

- Compromised/pragmatic model: accepts openness of technology that may change the society, but denies the changes of 'peculiar values'
- Selective/provisional model: society may accept openness technology; but the process may be slow; gradually expanding openness of technologies.

Model Fit of ITC Cooperation

- ITC Cooperation with China
 - China on Personal Data Privacy Law of 21 August 2021
 - “It also lays out conditions for which companies can collect personal data, including obtaining an individual’s consent, as well as laying out guidelines for ensuring data protection when data is transferred outside the country.”
 - “The law’s passage completes another pillar in the country’s efforts to regulate cyberspace and is expected to add more compliance requirements for companies in the country.”
 - Source: “China passes new personal data privacy law, to take effect Nov. 1,” *Reuter*, 20 August 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-passes-new-personal-data-privacy-law-take-effect-nov-1-2021-08-20/>
 - Growing state control over cyberspace and ‘online nationalism’ in China constitutes barriers to the cooperation between China and ‘openness- and universal value- oriented’ societies

ROK-Russia Economic Cooperation in Pandemic Situation



- Pandemic effect may be replaced by a Bloc participation when the competition between development models intensified.
- Blurred boarder between civil and military use of technologies may narrow the cooperation of high-tech area, and actors seek 'relative gains' instead of 'absolute gains',
- and thus, a new frame of cooperation focusing 'humanitarian values', not competition may be required.
 - i.e. Outer space cooperation for humanitarian value or connecting the world

V. Discussion

- Existing economic cooperation will be gradually shrinking and, the importance of **the cooperation in high-tech area grows crucial**.
- Competition between **development models may hamper the economic cooperation across bloc borders**.
- Competition for well-being of the general public and economic success of a development model **highlights the strategic aspect of high technology**.
 - High-tech can be easily converted into military use.
 - ITC cooperation is getting more sensitive to the openness of related parties/societies.

- ROK-Russia cooperation in high tech sectors is apt to be affected by the relations among superpowers, more likely than in existing area of cooperation.
- 6G services based on outer space network may eventually bring expanded connectiveness and openness,
- on one hand linking societies, but on the other hand demarcating the societies.
 - outer space cooperation also demands a 'new' approach, based on the principles of 'universal value' and peaceful use of high technologies. .. Fin.

Thank you for your attention